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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal by plaintiffs from a final judgment dismissing plaintiffs' complaint for failure to comply
with an Order compelling deposit of security deposits.
FACTS OF THE CASE AND DISPOSITION
IN THE LOWER COURT
Because this appeal is on a pre-trial motion dealing with the provisions of Rule 67 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, the facts on appeal are essentially the facts relating to the disposition of the relevant pre-trial motions
in the lower court.
Globe Leasing Corporation, a Utah Corporation, and
Bank of Salt Lake, a Utah Corporation, entered into an agreement July 17, 1973, whereby Bank of Salt Lake would selectively finance some or all of Globe Leasing1s lease agreements.

It was agreed that this arrangement would continue

until written notice terminated the arrangement.(File p. 8)
For purposes of background only, the court should be aware
that Globe Leasing was in the business of leasing automobiles
and other vehicles to its customers. (File p. 1)

The Bank of

Salt Lake would finance the purchase of the automobiles and
Globe Leasing would assign a lease agreement between Globe
Leasing and its customers to the Bank of Salt Lake as security
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for the loan made by the Bank to Globe Leasing. (File p. 1)
As part of the collections

Globe Leasing would make from

its customers, the customers would give Globe Leasing a security deposit to ensure proper care of the leased vehicle and
payment of the rentals. (File pp. 145,146).

On July 17, 1974,

Globe Leasing was abruptly notified that the agreement between
the Bank of Salt Lake and Globe Leasing was terminated. (File
p. 8)

The Bank on July 15, 1974 had written letters to Globe

Leasing's customers informing them that they no longer were
to pay Globe Leasing but were now to pay the Bank.

On July

23, 1974, Globe Leasing filed its complaint alleging various
counts of business interference and business slander. (File
P- 1)
A temporary restraining order was issued on July 30,
1974, restraining the Bank of Salt Lake from collecting or
holding any lease payments. (File p. 19)

On the same day,

defendants filed a motion to dismiss and compel payment of
funds. (File p. 27)

On August 1, 1974, defendants' motions

were denied because they were not properly presented and defendant Bank of Salt Lake was ordered to collect rental payments and make a strict accounting. (File p. 35)

On that day,

defendants filed their answer to the complaint. (File p. 36) On
August 5, 1974, Mr. Weigelt's deposition was taken (File p.
109)

On August 20, 1974, defendants filed a motion to compel

depositing of security deposits.(File p. 86)
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1974, Norton Parker (a defendant in this case) has his
deposition taken. On September 12, 1974, defendants1 motion
to compel deposit of funds is granted. (File p. 224)

March

7, 1975, defendants filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs1
complaint on grounds that the order of September 12, 1974
is not complied with. (File p. 293)

On April 9, 1975, plain-

tiff s are given ten days to deposit security deposits. (File
p. 300)

On April 16, 1975, plaintiffs filed a motion to vacate

the order to deposit. (File p. 304)

Between April 16 and April

23, 1975, the then counsel for plaintiffs withdrew from the
case.

On April 28, 1975, present counsel entered his appear-

ance for plaintiffs.(File p. 309)

During the interim of chang-

ing counsel, on April 23, 1975, an order dismissing the complaint was issued. (File p. 307)

Plaintiffs' April 16, 1975

motion is denied on May 15, 1975 for non-appearance at the
April 23, 1975 hearing on dismissal.

(File p. 313)

Plaintiffs

then filed a motion attacking jurisdiction which was denied
May 16, 1975, because it was filed after the order dismissing
the complaint.

(File p. 314)

On the filing of a verified

motion by plaintiffs' counsel explaining his reasons for nonappearance, the court sets the motion to vacate order to deposit for hearing on May 21, 1975. (File p. 319)
1975, plaintiffs' motion is denied,

On May 21,

(File p. 320)

the April

23, 1975 order is vacated and re-entered as a final judgment
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against plaintiffs. (File p. 323)

Plaintiffs file a

motion attacking the original September 12, 1974 order to
deposit security deposits as void for lack of jurisdiction
and attack the order of dismissal on the same grounds,
(File p. 325)

Plaintiffs1 motion is denied, (File p. 338),

after it finally got back to Judge Hall for hearing.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The order of May 21, 1975, dismissing plaintiffs1
complaint should be vacated for lack of jurisdiction, as the
order of September 12, 1974, compelling deposit of security
deposits was entered without jurisdiction.

The case should

be remanded to the District Court for trial setting to determine the issues of law and fact in this case.
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION
TO ISSUE AN ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFFS TO
DEPOSIT SECURITY DEPOSITS IN THE SUM OF $11,323.47
BECAUSE THE ORDER WAS ISSUED IN VIOLATION OF RULE
67 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
Appellants contend that the court had no authority
to issue its order because the requisite fact situation required by Rule 67 did not exist.
At the outset, Rule 67 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure must be carefully examined with respect to the facts
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in this case. The Rule, insofar as it is pertinent to
this case, reads as follows:
"When it is admitted by the pleadings, or shown upon the examination of a party,
that he has in his possession or under his control any money or other thing capable of delivery,
which, being the subject of litigation, is held
by him as trustee for another party, or which
belongs or is due to another party, the court
may order the same, upon motion, to be deposited
in court or delivered to such party upon such
conditions as may be just, subject to the further
direction of the court . . ."
It is clear from the very face of the rule that
five (5) requirements must be met by the fact situation in
this case before the court can order funds to be deposited.
Those requirements are:
1. The party being ordered to deposit
funds must admit non-ownership by his pleadings or
upon examination.
2. The party being ordered to deposit
must admit that he has the funds in his possession
or under his control.
3.
4.
litigation."

The funds must be capable of delivery.
The funds must be "the subject of

5. The party being ordered to deposit
must admit that the funds are held in trust by him
for another party or that the funds belong or are
due to another party.
Appellants strenuously contend on appeal, as they did
to the lower court by memoranda and by oral argument, that
these prerequisites to the issuance of an order to deposit
were not met by the facts of this case.

In order to make this
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point completely clear to the court, Appellants will examine
each of the rules requirements with respect to the facts in
this case and with respect to case authority interpreting the
rule.

For purposes of continuity requirements, 1 and 5 of

the rule will be discussed together.
;A
AT NO TIME HAVE APPELLANTS ADMITTED THAT
THE FUNDS IN QUESTION BELONG OR ARE DUE
TO THE BANK OF SALT LAKE OR TO THE LESSEES
AND HAVE AFFIRMATIVELY CONTENDED THAT THE
FUNDS ARE APPELLANTS' PROPERTY AND THAT
APPELLANTS HAVE THE RIGHT TO USE THOSE
FUNDS AS THEY WISH UNTIL THE TERMS OF THE
LEASE ARE COMPLIED WITH.
It is curious indeed that at oral argument Appellee,
in the face of the rule's requirement, states, r'That fact is
evidenced by Mr. Weigelt, president of Globe, by his deposition,
by Mr. Parker, the president of the banks affidavit, by his
deposition and by the documents which are before the Court . . • "
(File p. 345)

It is crystal clear from the Rule that any com-

ments or writings, except those by Mr. Weigelt, are irrelevant
for purposes of admittance of ownership under the rule.

It is

Mr. Weigelt who must admit that the funds do not belong to Globe
Leasing and at no time has he done so. But since Appellee contends that Mr. Weigelt has admitted its lack of ownership, it
will be useful to the court to examine Mr. Weigelt1s statement
as recorded in the file before the Court.
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During the taking of Mr. Weigelt's deposition,
the subject of the deposits for security was discussed very
briefly three times, twice by direct reference and once indirectly.
The subject first appears at page 5 of his deposition.
(File p. 113)

Counsel for defendant has been asking questions

about Mr. Weigelt's first marriage with respect to alimony,
child support and other debts. Mr. Weigelt's then counsel
challenges the line of questioning.

Mr. Kipp, counsel for

defendant, responds:
"Yes, I would like to find out
something about the financial situation of
the Corporation with respect to the security
of certain funds we have in dispute; and I
would think any obligations which they have
relating to payments of alimony, child support, mortgages, other debts, would be relevant.
That's what I intend to ask about."
The reference to security deposits is vague and indefinite, but if this reference by Mr. Kipp is taken to be
an admittance of ownership or trusteeship by Mr. Weigelt,
Appellants fail to understand what the word admittance means.
Mr. Weigelt has not uttered a word.
The subject of security deposits is raised directly
at pages 37 and 38 of the deposition. (File, pp 145, 146).
Q.

Didn't you also collect a security deposit
from the lessee?

A. Yes.
Q.

How much was that?
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A.

I believe in the case of Richter-Robb it's
probably $150.00.

Q.

And it varied thereafter between what sums?

A.

A high of $250.00, to a low of $100.00.

Q.

What happened to that money?

A.

That money's utilized by the corporation as
operating capital.

Q. And it's your position that that money was
not to be paid to the bank?
A.

It was not, and it is not supposed to be.

Whatever admittance is made in these statements, it
is clear, is it not, that Mr. Weigelt directly denies that the
Bank of Salt Lake has any right to the security deposits. Nor
does Mr. Weigelt admit to any ownership by the lessees. On the
contrary, Mr. Weigelt's admittance that the money was spent
in the course of business lends itself to only one interpretation, to-wit: that the money belonged to the Corporation for
the duration of the leases and they were perfectly within their
right to use the security deposits as operating capital because
they had a proprietary right, a vested proprietary right to the
use of the money.

In short, these comments as quoted offer no

compliance with the admittance aspects of Rule 67 on which to
base an order to deposit funds.
The subject appears in the deposition one last time
at page 59. (File p. 167)
Q.

And you've told me that you collected so-called
security deposits ranging from $100.00 to $250.00,
and that those sums have been retained by Globe
Leasing?
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A.

Correct.

Read in the context of the rest of the deposition,
these statements admit only what has already been discussed,
namely that the money was collected and spent as operating
capital.

From Mr. Weigelt's deposition, there is absolutely

no compliance with the requirements of Rule 67.
The subject of security deposits appears twice more
in the file before the Court. At page 101 of the file, in
Plaintiffs' Reply to Counterclaim, under Plaintiffs' second
defense, Plaintiff states:
1.

Plaintiff GLOBE LEASING CORPORATION admits
that it has received a certain sum of money
as security but denies that in or in all [sic]
said security deposits are the property of
[sic] should be paid over to the defendant
BANK OF SALT LAKE.

This reply was submitted on September 6, 1974, just
seven days before the original order to deposit was granted.
No compliance with the admittance aspects of Rule 67 appears
and read in context with Mr. Weigelt's deposition is clearly
consistent with comments in that deposition.
At page 222 of the file before the Court in an affidavit
filed two days before the original order, Plaintiffs denied that
the Defendant Bank of Salt Lake had any "claim to or interest
in any lease deposits collected by Globe Leasing Corporation.
As [sic] agreed at the time of the original agreement. . ."
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Clearly, Appellants have never admitted that any
other party had any claim or title to the security deposit
funds. Quite the contrary is true. Appellants have admitted
by their statements and by implication that Appellants are
the only parties that have a right to the use of the funds
and that their only covenant was to have a sufficient amount
of money at the end of any particular lease to return the
deposit that had been given if the terms of the lease were
complied with.
That admittance of ownership or trusteeship in
favor of another party is a crucial requirement of the Rule and
is the subject of many cases interpreting Rule 67.
in In re Elias, 25 Cal. Rptr. 739, 209 C. App. 2d 262
(1962), the issue on appeal was the same as in the instant case.
It was alleged that the lower court was without jurisdiction
to issue the order to deposit.

In interpreting a rule, the

exact duplicate of the Utah Rule, and after an extensive review of the authorities, the court said:
"As we have seen, there is no admission
by Harry Elias in any pleading filed up to date
that any sum is owed by him to the plaintiff or
to any other person; both he and the surety company deny any indebtedness on his part; and it
has not been proven that any such sum is in fact
due because the trial has not yet been held."
(25 Cal. Rptr. at 745) (Emphasis added.)
The Court in In re Elias, supra, quotes favorably
from Ex Parte Casey, 71 Cal. 269, 12 P. 118 at 119:
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"Section 572, of the Code of
Civil Procedure, [the exact duplicate of
Utahfs Rule 67] refers to property which
is, without question, in the hands of a
trustee as trust property, or which belongs
to or is due to another. It does not refer
to that where the party alleged to hold as
trustee claims title to it in his own right."
(Emphasis added.)
The Elias, supra, court also cites with agreement
Burke v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. App. 178, 93 P. 1058 (1907):
"His answer showed that petitioner
claimed the right to part of the fund in his
possession, and the court was without jurisdiction to compel him to surrender to another
what he claimed to be his property, until there
had been a judicial determination, upon the
hearing of all the facts, that he had no right
to it. To justify the making of the order, the
admission in the pleadings of having money in
possession belonging to another must be free
from any claim thereto." (93 P. at 1060)
(Emphasis added.)
To the same effect are Sanborn v. Blankenheim,
346 111. App. 214, 104 N.E. 2d 573 (1952), Brooks v. Galicia
Steamship Company,

Fla.

, 237 So. 2nd 583 (1970),

HMR Development Corp. v. District Court, 152 Colo. 266, 381
P. 2d 259 (1963), Bata v. Hill, 35 D. Ch. 184, 113 A. 2d 740
(1955), City of Philadelphia v. Schofield, 375 Pa. 554, 101
A. 2d 625 (1954).
It is clear that Appellants have never once admitted
and have consistently denied that Appellants owed any money to
Bank of Salt Lake or that the money was held in a trust fund
for Lessees. To repeat, Appellants have consistently affirmed
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their proprietary interest in the money ar.I their right to
the use of the money.

(File p. 223)

In short, they assert

ownership of the money which counsel for defendant disputed
at oral argument.

Even assuming, arguendo, that Appellants

may be in error as to their belief about the ownership and
rights to the funds, the cases are clear, that that is a
decision that mist

be made after a iaearing on all the facts.

The meaning of the word deposit, the effect of that meaning
under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code* whether or
not the leases are actual salens or security agreements, the
effect of those determinations as to the rights of ownership
and use of the funds, and other obvious ciuestions must be
decided at trial, not in a summary proceeding«
Appellants, therefore, submit chat the lower court
was without jurisdiction to issue the order to deposit based
on the facts and case law pertinent to the instant case.
Appellants further submit that to force them to deposit funds
when the court is without jurisdiction is a denial of procedural due process and the subsequent order of dismissal was
made in error.
B

;•

AT NO TIME HAVE APPELLANTS ADMITTED THAT THE
FUNDS IN QUESTION ARE UNDER THEIR PRESENT CONTROL OR POSSESSION AND THEREFORE THE MONEY IS
NOT CAPABLE OF DELIVERY AND THE LOWER COURT
WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO ORDER A DEPOSIT
OF THE FUNDS UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Requirements 2 and 3 of Rule 67 will be treated together for sake of brevity and to avoid repetition.
The fact that the money is gone has been raised in
several cases.
In Burke v. Superior Court, supra, the court said
at 93 P. 1059:
"The court's jurisdiction to make the
order requiring petitioner to deposit in court the
sum of $2,050 was, under the provisions of said
Section [the exact duplicate of Utah's Rule] dependent upon whether or not petitioner by his pleading admitted having in his possession said sum of
money belonging to the corporation. if he did not
make such admission, then it would seem clear that
the court was without jurisdiction to make such order."
(Emphasis added.)
Other cases have held the same. Brooks v. Galicia
Steamship Co., supra, Sanborn v. Blankenheim, supra, In re
Elias, supra, Firemen's Mut. Benev.flss'nof City of New York
v. Clifford, 201 App. Div. 315, 194 N.Y.S. 295 (1922), and
Intra-Mar Shipping (Cuba) S.A« v. John S. Emery & Co., 11 FRD
284 (S.D.N.Y., 1951).

In Intra Mar, supra, there was absolute

proof that the funds in question were spent.

The court had

this to say with respect to that requirement of the Rule calling
for capability of delivery:
"It is unnecessary to now determine
whether defendant became a trustee of the moneys
it collected. It is clear from plaintiff's affidavits and briefs that the fund in question
has been spent by defendant and that there is no
longer any property capable of delivery. It was
the discovery of this fact on examination of defendant's officers that prompted plaintiff to
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renew with added vigor this motion, which
had been previously made and denied. Aside
from this, we have no unequivocal admission
on defendant's part that the funds are held
by it." (Il FRD at 285) (Emphasis added.)
It is clear from the cases cited and the facts in
this case that the money is no longer in plaintiffs1 possession and therefore the lower court was without jurisdiction to issue an order to deposit.

The clear purpose of

the rule is to preserve a fund actually xo existence and
actually controlled by the party ordered to be deposited.
See all cases previously cited and also Lakewood Trust Co.,
et al., v. Lawshance Co., 100 N.J.E. 572, 136 A. 181 (1927),
Graysonia, N. & A.R. Co. v. Newberger Cotton Co., 170 Ark.
1039, 282 S. W. 975 (1926), Robinson v. City of Pine Bluff,
224 Ark. 791, 271 S.W. 2d 419 (1955).

In every case cited,

the rule interpreted is the same rule that is under discussion
in this case. When the fund is gone, for whatever reason, the
order cannot issue.

Furthermore, questions and issues presented

at the beginning of this section must be decided at trial. It
is also of significance that at oral argument plaintiffs also
argued that the deposits were worked into the leases so that
at the end of a lease the deposit could be returned. (File pp.
348, 355)

It is also of significance that if this claim is

true, which must be proved at trial, it is the Bank who is now
collecting all the rentals (File p. 35, 57) and, therefore, both
the Bank and the Lessees are secure in their interests to the
deposits.
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The District Court, therefore, was without authority
to issue the order to deposit because it lacked the jurisdiction to do so.
C
THE LOWER COURT WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION
TO ISSUE THE ORDER TO DEPOSIT SECURITY
DEPOSITS BECAUSE IN ACCEPTING DEFENDANTS'
THEORY OF THE CASE AT ORAL ARGUMENT IT
ISSUED THE ORDER IN THE FACE OF DEFENDANTS'
POSITION THAT THE FUNDS WERE NOT THE SUB• JECT OF THE LITIGATION AND EVEN IF THE
COURT DID NOT ACCEPT DEFENDANTS' THEORY
AND THE FUNDS ARE THE SUBJECT OF THE LITIGATION, THE ORDER CANNOT ISSUE BECAUSE
TITLE TO THE FUNDS WAS IN DISPUTE.
Defendants' argument at page 347 of the file before
the court, contending at lines 4-10 in connection with the
rest of defendants' statements that this case is distinguishable from the authorities cited because the money is not in
dispute between the litigants, i. e. the fund is not "the
subject litigation!"

The court seems to accept the argument

and in the face of the rule requiring that the fund being deposited be the subject of the litigation allows the order to
stand!

Even more impossible to understand, under the facts in

this case, is that at the same time Defense

counsel argues his

impossible situation he also implies that if the cases were applicable, the order cannot stand.
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Defense counsel has made a very unique attempt to
escape the impact of the rule.

It is apparent, first of all,

from the pleadings, affidavits and motions in this case, that
at the outset Defendants were claiming the security deposits
as "their" property," that the funds were "due them" and that
apparently plaintiffs had assigned all their rights to any
funds plaintiffs might have collected and that the monies were
in dispute.

(File, pp. 28, 37, 39, 211, 212, 215)

It is ap-

parent from defendants1 motions that they were claiming title
to the funds and in desperation attempted to distinguish the
cases on a position conflicting with that stated in affidavits
and motions. But in choosing to use this conflicting position,
defendants cannot overcome Rule 67. If the money is not in
dispute between the litigants, the rule does not apply.

If

the money is in dispute as the affidavits, motions and pleadings show, then conflicting titles to ownership and rights of
use cannot be decided under Rule 67 but must be left to trial
to be resolved by normal judicial proceedings. Clearly, the
lower court was without jurisdiction to issue the order to
deposit.
:

D

SINCE THE COURT WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO
ISSUE THE ORDER TO DEPOSIT SECURITY DEPOSITS
IT WAS ALSO WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO DISMISS
THE PLAINTIFFS' CAUSE OF ACTION BASED ON AN
UNAUTHORIZED ORDER.
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Burke v. Superior Court, supra, and In re Elias,
supra, both indicate that if the order to deposit is void,
any other order based on the original void order is also
invalid.
-

CONCLUSION

v

Based on the pleadings, motions, affidavits and
depositions of Mr. Weigelt in this case, the order to deposit
security deposits was void and a nullity because Mr. Weigelt
did not admit adverse ownership of the funds, possession of
the funds, control of the funds, that he held them in trust
for anyone, or any other fact which could have given the court
jurisdiction to issue the order.

To the contrary, Mr. Weigelt

alleged that the funds were rightfully Globe Leasing's, that
he could use them in his business, that they were in fact used
in the business and are no longer capable of delivery for they
no longer exist.
Therefore, Plaintiffs-Appellants respectfully submit
to this court that the order to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint
and to deposit funds be vacated and that the case be remanded
to the lower court to be set for trial and a determination of
the issues of law and fact presented by this case.
Respectfully submitted,
HATCH, Mc£A£ &7RICHARDSON
By.

Pu^l_

Robert M. McRae
Attorney
for
PlaintiffsDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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School,
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Appellants
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